Key player identification: a note on weighted connectivity games and the Shapley value

被引:1
|
作者
Lindelauf, Roy [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Blankers, Iris [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Netherlands Def Acad, Mil Operat Art & Sci, POB 90002, NL-4800 PA Breda, Netherlands
[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econometr & OR, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
D O I
10.1109/ASONAM.2010.33
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
The use of graph theory in social network analysis to identify the most important actors is well-known. More recently game theory has also been applied to measure centrality as variation in the power due to the social structure. Here we present such a solution concept from cooperative game theory, the Shapley value, to identify key players engaged in a network. The communication structure among the players is modeled by use of the so-called connectivity game. We analyze standard networks representative of covert organizations and present results on the centrality of players organized according to an a-symmetric path structure. In addition we present an analysis of a weighted connectivity game in which the worth of coalitions not only depends on their interaction structure but also on exogenous factors.
引用
收藏
页码:356 / 359
页数:4
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] A note on the relation between the Shapley value and the core of 3-player transferable utility games
    Dehez, Pierre
    Pacini, Pier Mario
    [J]. ECONOMICS BULLETIN, 2024, 44 (02):
  • [2] A Note on a Class of Solutions for Games with Externalities Generalizing the Shapley Value
    Sanchez-Perez, Joss
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 2015, 17 (03)
  • [3] The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
    Xun-Feng Hu
    [J]. TOP, 2020, 28 : 193 - 212
  • [4] The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
    Hu, Xun-Feng
    [J]. TOP, 2020, 28 (01) : 193 - 212
  • [5] NOTE ON THE SHAPLEY VALUE
    OWEN, G
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (11) : 731 - 732
  • [6] Efficiently computing the Shapley value of connectivity games in low-treewidth graphs
    van der Zanden, Tom C.
    Bodlaender, Hans L.
    Hamers, Herbert J. M.
    [J]. OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2023, 23 (01)
  • [7] Efficiently computing the Shapley value of connectivity games in low-treewidth graphs
    Tom C. van der Zanden
    Hans L. Bodlaender
    Herbert J. M. Hamers
    [J]. Operational Research, 2023, 23
  • [8] The Shapley value for bicooperative games
    J. M. Bilbao
    J. R. Fernández
    N. Jiménez
    J. J. López
    [J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2008, 158 : 99 - 115
  • [9] On the Shapley value of liability games
    Csoka, Peter
    Illes, Ferenc
    Solymosi, Tamas
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2022, 300 (01) : 378 - 386
  • [10] The Shapley value for bicooperative games
    Bilbao, J. M.
    Fernandez, J. R.
    Jimenez, N.
    Lopez, J. J.
    [J]. ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2008, 158 (01) : 99 - 115