Restrictive Rating and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance

被引：5
|
作者：
Born, Patricia H. [1 ]
Sirmans, E. Tice [2 ]
机构：
[1] Florida State Univ, Dr William T Hold Natl Alliance Program Risk Mana, Insurance, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
[2] Illinois State Univ, Dept Finance Insurance & Law, Normal, IL 61761 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE | 2020年 / 87卷 / 04期
关键词：
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; PATIENT PROTECTION; MARKETS; DEMAND; REFORM; EQUILIBRIUM; POLICY;
D O I：
10.1111/jori.12282
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Recent healthcare reform in the United States, including rating restrictions, imposed substantial changes to health insurer operations. We provide evidence of the presence of adverse selection following the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. Using a unique dataset consisting of information on health insurance plans from multiple health insurers, across states for the years 2013-2017, we document a statistically significant correlation between coverage and risk, indicating the presence of adverse selection, that varies over time in both the individual and group markets for health insurance.
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页码：919 / 933
页数：15
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