Commitment lending under asymmetric information: Theory and tests on UK startup data

U.K. business startup data is used to examine the role of contract parameters in solving the bank's problem of lending under asymmetric information. Margins are found to be a direct function of the probability of failure and an inverse function of security (for given loan size) consistently with collateral being invoked to solve the Moral Hazard problem. Business survival is also found to be enhanced by owner equity inputs (for given debt) again consistent with a recuirement for owner financial inputs to enhance (unobservable) effort. Security rises along with loan size and survival chances, a finding consistent with (a) a firm loan size effect (larger borrowers have lower marginal admin cost to the bank), and with (b) positive borrower self-selection (better borrowers offer collateral because they are less likely to experience forfeiture.) Observable business characteristics are found to play an important intermediary role in the solution to the moral hazard problem. More mature proprietors have more experience, business commitment, assets for borrowing and the willingness to use them for loan collateral. Their contract parameters reflect these facts.