A convergence approach to the analysis of political corruption: A cross-national study

A convergence approach to the analysis of country-level political corruption is proposed based on Cohen and Felson's routine activities theory of crime and Ades and Di Tells's tripartite analysis of corruption. It argues that although structural incentives, risky policies, and the lack of effective institutional guardians independently contribute to the causation of corruption, their convergence in time and space creates opportunities for widespread and systematic corruption. Structural incentives are stable economic and cultural conditions and include economic hardships, particularism, and history of political unaccountability. Risky policies encompass monopolistic and interventionist practices by the government in the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. Institutional guardians refer to the judiciary, the press, opposition parties and the civil society that monitor officials' behavior. Data from 99 countries and territories are used to evaluate hypotheses derived from the theory. Findings lend strong support to the proposed formal propositions. It is also suggested that useful schemes for corruption diagnosis and reform can be developed from the theory.