CHOMSKY AND THE NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE

This essay presents Chomsky's views on the New Theory of Reference. As against that theory, particularly against well-known ideas of Kripke's and Putnam's, Chomsky adduces a varied range of arguments whose main conclusions are the following: (i) that there no logically pure names in natural languages; (ii) that there is no non-artificial relation of reference which links words and things; (iii) that the so-called theory of reference deploys concepts which are alien to the methodological requirements built into natural science; and (iv) that meaning "is in the head". Aiming at bringing out the assumptions that support (i) - (iv), the essays hold that Chomsky's rejection of the New Theory of Reference is shaped by his methodological naturalism, his pragmatic attitude towards ontology, his conceptual perspectivism, and his rationalism.