Price transmission, reserve regulation and price volatility

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Chinese pork reserve regulation policy fulfills its function in stabilizing market prices and simultaneously to theoretically and empirically analyze the causes leading to the failure of Chinese Government's intervention in the market, especially in the context of asymmetric pork and hog price information transmission. Design/methodology/approach - A modified Reserve-Cobweb model based on the competitive storage model developed by Muth in 1961 is employed to examine the transmission effect of hog and pork prices under the setting of Chinese Government's pork reserve regulation policy, using the data on Chinese hog and pork prices from June 2009 to June 2015. Findings - While the Reserve-Cobweb model provides theoretical insights, suggesting that the implementation of the government's reserve policy tool to control price volatility actually leads to increased price volatility, the empirical results indicate that the policy induces hypercorrection and impels greater price volatility, especially in the context of existence of asymmetric price information transmission. Social implications - The Chinese Government should reduce excessive pork price intervention and instead allow the market to play its role in the hog and pork markets. Originality/value - This paper develops a modified Reserve-Cobweb model based on the price transmission effect on different links within the agricultural products supply chain, which is used to empirically validate the existence of asymmetric price information transmission between pork and hog price in China.