Delegation of board work to committees in Europe

被引:2
|
作者
de Andres, Pablo [1 ]
Arranz-Aperte, Laura [1 ,2 ]
Antonio Rodriguez-Sanz, Juan [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Autonoma Madrid, Finance Dept, Cantoblanco Campus, Madrid 28049, Spain
[2] Hanken Sch Econ, Hanken Ctr Corp Governance, Akadiankatu 22, Helsinki 00101, Finland
[3] Univ Valladolid, Finance & Accounting Dept, Avda Valle Esgueva 6, E-47011 Valladolid, Spain
关键词
Board of directors; Committees; Corporate governance; European companies; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; AUDIT COMMITTEES; DIRECTORS; EARNINGS; ADOPTION;
D O I
10.1007/s10101-017-0191-y
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A sample of 6169 firm year observations in 14 western European countries between 2002 and 2009 is used to investigate how committee practice within boards of directors is related to company characteristics, and to the existence of alternative corporate governance instruments in place. We find that committees in Europe are prevalent in larger companies, and in companies with large and independent boards. However, we also find that leverage, director interlocking, concentrated ownership, and the presence of managers on the board mitigate the use of committees, suggesting that committee use is limited by the existence of alternative governance mechanisms. Consequently, recent regulatory changes in Europe that promote the creation of committees within boards may be unsuited for certain types of company, especially smaller companies and those with concentrated ownership.
引用
收藏
页码:179 / 208
页数:30
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