Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

被引:18
|
作者
Fox, Jeremy T. [1 ,2 ]
Yang, Chenyu [3 ]
Hsu, David H. [4 ]
机构
[1] Rice Univ, Houston, TX 77251 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[4] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
RANDOM-COEFFICIENTS; NONPARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION; MODEL ESTIMATION; HEDONIC MODELS; CHOICE MODELS; OUTCOMES; DETERMINANTS; EQUILIBRIUM; SELECTION;
D O I
10.1086/697740
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider manyto-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of matchspecific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.
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页码:1339 / 1373
页数:35
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