ENDOWMENTS, PERCEIVED SIMILARITY, AND DICTATOR GIVING

被引:2
|
作者
Goerg, Sebastian J. [1 ]
Johnson, David B. [2 ]
Rogers, Jonathan D. [3 ]
机构
[1] Florida State Univ, Dept Econ, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
[2] Univ Cent Missouri, Dept Econ Finance & Mkt, Warrensburg, MO 64093 USA
[3] NYUAD, Social Sci Expt Lab, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
关键词
PROPERTY-RIGHTS; COOPERATION; GAMES; IDENTITY; DISCRIMINATION; PREFERENCES; RECIPROCITY; COMPETITION;
D O I
10.1111/ecin.12408
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A common assumption of money is that it is fungible. An implication of this assumption is that the source of money does not affect economic decision making. We find evidence contradicting this fungibility assumption. Specifically, we explore how the perception of an endowment source influences amounts sent in a dictator game. We find perceived similarity to the endowment provider to be negatively correlated with dictator offers. Dictators who consider themselves relatively more similar to their endowment provider send significantly smaller amounts to their partners. Our results demonstrate that economic decision making can be influenced by the provider of income shocks. (JEL C78, C91, C99, D31, D64, D74)
引用
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页码:1130 / 1144
页数:15
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