Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities

被引：2
|
作者：
Hu, Youxin [1 ]
Kagel, John [2 ]
Xu, Xiaoshu [3 ]
Ye, Lixin [2 ]
机构：
[1] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Res Inst Econ & Management, Chengdu 610074, Peoples R China
[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2013年 / 82卷
关键词：
Auctions; Externality; Free riding; Aggressive bidding; Experiments; DISCONTINUOUS GAMES; STANDARD AUCTIONS; LICENSE AUCTIONS; INFORMATION; DESIGN;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.012
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We investigate a private value auction in which a single "entrant" on winning imposes a negative externality on two "regular" bidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, "regular" bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches their values. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free riding compared to the English auction. We find substantial, though incomplete, free riding in the clock auction. In first-price auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the "entrant" and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality. Predictions regarding revenue, efficiency, and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：269 / 291
页数：23
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