Why do firms pay high underwriting fees? SEO withdrawal, underwriter certification and CEO turnover

被引:3
|
作者
Ursel, Nancy D. [1 ]
Zhong, Ligang [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Windsor, Odette Sch Business, Windsor, ON N9B 3P4, Canada
关键词
CEO turnover; Withdrawn stock issues; Underwriting fee; Investment banking; Survival analysis; SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS; INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SECURITY OFFERINGS; DIRECTORS; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; VALUATION; CONTRACTS; COMPANIES;
D O I
10.1016/j.intfin.2017.05.009
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
CEO turnover increases when announced stock issues are withdrawn, even after controlling for endogeneity and firm performance. However, greater underwriter certification of a stock issue is associated with lower CEO turnover. Together, these two findings suggest that the corporate governance practice of terminating CEOs for unsuccessful offerings and the resulting managerial career concerns may help explain the puzzle that managers of issuing firms show little concern for the level of underwriting fees charged: CEOs may use underwriters to help protect their CEO positions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:98 / 113
页数:16
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