CEO turnover increases when announced stock issues are withdrawn, even after controlling for endogeneity and firm performance. However, greater underwriter certification of a stock issue is associated with lower CEO turnover. Together, these two findings suggest that the corporate governance practice of terminating CEOs for unsuccessful offerings and the resulting managerial career concerns may help explain the puzzle that managers of issuing firms show little concern for the level of underwriting fees charged: CEOs may use underwriters to help protect their CEO positions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Cornell Univ, SC Johnson Coll Business, Samuel Curtis Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USACornell Univ, SC Johnson Coll Business, Samuel Curtis Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
Guest, Nicholas M.
Kothari, S. P.
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MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USACornell Univ, SC Johnson Coll Business, Samuel Curtis Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
Kothari, S. P.
Pozen, Robert C.
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MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USACornell Univ, SC Johnson Coll Business, Samuel Curtis Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA