Rationalizing allocation data - a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian

被引:3
|
作者
Bachmann, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
testability; non-parametric restrictions; Walrasian equilibria; quantifier elimination; strong axiom of revealed equilibrium;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we develop a nonparametric Walrasian theory for allocation data. We show, using the Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem, that for each such data set or social plan, there exist necessary and sufficient conditions on this data set to decide, whether it can be supported by prices. This demonstrates that the cooperative foundation of the Walrasian theory and the decentralization theory for social plans can be formulated independently of theoretical, unobservable notions. We state and prove these conditions for a Walrasian equilibrium of a two-agent, n-good economy with two observations on individual endowments and final consumptions. In doing so, we develop a general framework for deriving conditions on data sets in terms of linear programs that characterize utility-based solution concepts. Applying this framework, we extend the analysis to more agents and specialize to quasi-linearity. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:271 / 295
页数:25
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