The 'argument of the illusion' and the Cartesian philosophy of ideas

In Sense and Sensibilia, Austin give a critical analysis of the usual conception of perception which states that we do not perceive directly material objects but sense data, ideas, or impressions. He underlines, against Descartes, that our senses are dumb and point out that the aim of the argument of sensory illusion is to posit some sort of intermediary entities. In this paper, I focus on the Cartesian example of the stick which seems broken in water in Sixth Responses to show if there are any differences between his statements and Austin's about what is really perceived, I emphasize that considering that perception is a mental act does not implicate that the representations are the perceived objects. With the notion of 'virtual reflexion' used by Arnauld in his Des vraies et des fausses idees, to explain the objective reality of ideas in Descartes' thought, I expose a Cartesian philosophy of ideas which does not posit representative beings, and I examine under this light the radical Austinian conception of perceptions.