Mary meets Molyneux: The explanatory gap and the individuation of phenomenal concepts

被引：8

|

作者：

MacDonald, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Canterbury, Christchurch 1, New Zealand

来源：

NOUS | 2004年 / 38卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00480.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

收藏

页码：503 / 524

页数：22

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