Why Do Firms Switch Banks? Evidence from China

被引:9
|
作者
Yin, Wei [1 ]
Matthews, Kent [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Dongnandaxue Rd 2, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff Business Sch, Cardiff, S Glam, Wales
[3] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Publ Finance & Taxat, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Chinese banks; Chinese firms; switching behavior; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; INFORMATION; COSTS; MULTIPLE; SINGLE; SIZE; FORM;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2017.1343141
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article uses a sample of matched firms-banks data in China over the period 1999-2012 to determine the drivers of firms switching behavior from one bank relationship to another. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit needs of the firm. The binding force of the Communist Party in state-owned banks and enterprises would suggest that switching should be a rare phenomenon in Chinese commercial relations. But switching occurs. The findings support the extant literature that transparent firms are able to switch more readily than opaque firms. The results also suggest that banks that develop their fee income services are more effective in locking-in their borrowers and that firms tend to switch from state-owned banks to smaller non-state owned banks. However, in other areas switching does not conform with the mainstream explanations.
引用
收藏
页码:2040 / 2052
页数:13
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