The electoral effects of incumbent wealth

被引：17
|
作者：
Milyo, J [1 ]
Groseclose, T
机构：
[1] Tufts Univ, Medford, MA 02155 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS | 1999年 / 42卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1086/467439
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The absence of limits on own-source campaign contributions is widely thought to give wealthy candidates an advantage in congressional elections. We employ a unique data set on the wealth of House incumbents running for reelection in 1992. We find that wealthy incumbents do not raise or spend more campaign funds and do not win greater vote shares in their reelection bids. Further, incumbent wealth does not deter high-quality challengers.
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页码：699 / 722
页数：24
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