Litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases

被引:65
|
作者
Crampes, C [1 ]
Langinier, C
机构
[1] Toulouse Univ, Toulouse, France
[2] Iowa State Univ, Ames, IA 50011 USA
来源
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2002年 / 33卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3087433
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified. The patent holder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to court, to settle, or to accept entry. We investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game, even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high, the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial. The likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty, In sequential games, regardless who plays first, entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game.
引用
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页码:258 / 274
页数:17
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