Legislative Constraints, Ideological Conflict, and the Timing of Executive Unilateralism

Whether unilateral actions are used to circumvent legislative policy preferences is a central question in separated systems. Although executives have incentives to engage in this behavior, US policymaking studies offer little evidence of it. We explore how intervals between legislative sessions can create such opportunities, depending on interbranch policy disagreement and legislatures' special session powers. During intersession breaks, executives issue more executive orders under divided government relative to unified, but only when legislatures lack control over special sessions. Executives facing legislatures with such powers cannot exploit these breaks. We demonstrate these dynamics in the US states. Additionally, we find governors "wait out" legislatures without special session powers, engaging in more unilateral activity following the adjournment of sessions. This study has implications for understanding the conditions under which legislatures can constrain executive power and the balance of power in separated systems.