Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability

被引：52
|
作者：
Pollmann, Monique M. H. [1 ]
Potters, Jan [1 ]
Trautmann, Stefan T. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Tilburg Univ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Heidelberg Univ, D-69115 Heidelberg, Germany
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 123卷 / 03期
关键词：
Decision under risk; Decisions of agents; Accountability;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal. We observe that in the absence of accountability, agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account. Accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion. Differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision ("ex-ante") and where they are accountable for the outcome ("ex-post"). (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：387 / 390
页数：4
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