Begging the question and Bayesians

被引:0
|
作者
Weatherson, B [1 ]
机构
[1] Monash Univ, Dept Philosophy, Clayton, Vic 3168, Australia
来源
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 1999年 / 30A卷 / 04期
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中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
The arguments for Bayesianism in the literature fall into three broad categories. There are Dutch Book arguments, both of the traditional pragmatic variety and the modern 'depragmatised' form. And there are arguments from the so-called 'representation theorems'. The arguments have many similarities, for example they have a common conclusion, and they all derive epistemic constraints from considerations about coherent preferences, but they have enough differences to produce hostilities between their proponents. In a recent paper, Maher (1997) has argued that the pragmatised Dutch Book arguments are unsound and the depragmatised Dutch Book arguments question begging. He urges that we instead use the representation theorem argument as in his Betting on Theories (Maher, 1993). In this paper I argue that Maher's own argument is question-begging, though in a more subtle and interesting way than those of his Dutch Book-wielding opponents. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码:687 / 697
页数:11
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