Mentalism as a Radical Behaviorist Views It - Part 2

Part 1 of this review suggested that mentalism consists in explanations of behavior in terms of causal mental states and processes. These causal mental states and processes are inferred to reside in an unobservable dimension beyond that in which behavior occurs, and to function differently from environmental events, variables, and relations. One of those functions is inferred to be mediation, in which environmental events trigger a mediating state or process, which in turn triggers a response. For mentalism, an explanation should properly focus on specifying the causal role of the mediator, rather than talking about observable relations. Part 1 further suggested that mentalism is actually as integral to mediational neobehaviorism as it is to cognitive psychology, even though each claims to differ from the other. Part 2 continues the review of mentalism by addressing the relations among mentalism, operationism, and the meaning of scientific verbal behavior, especially when the verbal behavior involves private behavioral events. The review then considers some sources of mentalism, along with examples of how mentalism is supported in philosophy. Finally, the review summarizes the radical behaviorist opposition to mentalism. Overall, the review concludes that radical behaviorism differs from both cognitive psychology and mediational neobehaviorism, which radical behaviorism regards as comparably mentalistic.