The effect of asymmetric information on product market outcomes

被引:45
|
作者
Billett, Matthew T. [1 ]
Garfinkel, Jon A. [2 ]
Yu, Miaomiao [3 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, 1309 E 10th St, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
[2] Univ Iowa, Tippie Coll Business, 108 John Pappajohn Business Bldg, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
[3] Univ Saskatchewan, Edwards Sch Business, 25 Campus Dr, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A7, Canada
关键词
Asymmetric information; Analysts; Market share; ANALYST COVERAGE; INVESTMENT; ACCRUALS; QUALITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.11.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We explore how asymmetric information in financial markets affects outcomes in product markets. Difference-in-difference tests around brokerage house merger/closure events (which increase asymmetric information through reductions in analyst coverage) indicate worse industry-adjusted sales growth for shocked firms than for their peers. Our results are consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein's (1990) tradeoff between investor agency concerns and predation risk. Further support is found in stronger treatment effects among firms with ex ante greater agency concerns, financing constraints, asymmetric information, and those operating in ex ante more competitive (fluid) product market spaces. Our results are concentrated in industries where we can clearly identify either net firm entry or exit. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:357 / 376
页数:20
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