Limiting role of resource dependence: an examination of director interlocks, board meetings and family ownership

被引:6
|
作者
Panicker, Vidya Sukumara [1 ]
Upadhyayula, Rajesh Srinivas [2 ]
机构
[1] Loughborough Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Loughborough, Leics, England
[2] Indian Inst Management Kozhikode, Kozhikode, India
关键词
Board involvement; Board meetings; Director interlocks; Emerging markets; Family ownership; Independent directors; Insider directors; Internationalization; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; EMERGING ECONOMIES; OF-DIRECTORS; INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION; ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; GROUP AFFILIATION; SAMPLE SELECTION; UNITED-STATES;
D O I
10.1108/CCSM-01-2020-0006
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Purpose This paper attempts to examine the activity and involvement of board of directors in internationalization activities of firms in emerging markets, by evaluating the resource provisioning roles of interlocks provided by board of directors, and the frequency of board meetings. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of board involvement is contingent upon the levels of family ownership in firms since family ownership could impact the firm's ability to utilize the presence of different types of board members. Design/methodology/approach The authors test our hypotheses on a sample of listed Indian companies, extracted from the Prowess database published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a database of the financial performance of Indian companies. On a panel of 3,133 firm years of 605 unique Indian firms with foreign investments, over a time period of 2006-2017, the authors apply different estimation techniques. Findings The results demonstrate that both board meeting frequency and director interlocks are instrumental in supporting internationalization activities in emerging market firms. However, family ownership moderates the role of insider and independent interlocks on internationalization investments in different ways; the authors find that interlocks provided by independent directors support internationalization activities in family firms, whereas those provided by insider directors do not. Further, the study also finds that board meetings are less effective in internationalization of family firms. Practical implications The authors conclude that family firms aiming at international diversification require to develop more connected and networked independent directors to enable internationalization in firms. While independent director interlocks enhance the international investments, it is also useful to know that board meetings are ineffective in utilizing the resources in family firms. This points to the possibility that family firms should device mechanisms to integrate family meetings with board meetings so that they can utilize the within-family processes to aid in their internationalization decisions. Originality/value The study contributes to resource dependence theory by understanding its limiting role in family firms. Theoretically, it helps delineate the limiting resource provision role of the insider directors vis-a-vis independent directors. The authors argue that the resource provision role of insider director interlocks does not effectively help in internationalization in comparison to independent director interlocks in family-dominated firms. Consequently, the study shows the limiting role of resource provision and utilization by family-owned firms in comparison to non-family-owned firms.
引用
收藏
页码:424 / 451
页数:28
相关论文
共 16 条
  • [1] Board Interlocks with Information Technology Firms and Innovation Outcomes: A Resource Dependence Perspective
    Liu, Xiaowei
    Pinsonneault, Alain
    Qu, Wen Guang
    Dong, John Qi
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2024, 41 (03) : 812 - 838
  • [2] Board Interlocks and Firm Performance: Toward a Combined Agency-Resource Dependence Perspective
    Zona, Fabio
    Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.
    Withers, Michael C.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2018, 44 (02) : 589 - 618
  • [3] Board Quality Of SMESs In Malaysia: The Governing Role of Family Ownership
    Iskandar, Takiah Mohd
    Hassan, Nor Hazwani
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS CONFERENCE 2015, IABC 2015, 2015, 31 : 611 - 617
  • [4] Governing Ownership: A Case Study About the Board's Role in Family Business Ownership Decisions
    Ikaheimonen, Tuuli
    Rautiainen, Marita
    Pihkala, Timo
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 2016, : 281 - 287
  • [5] Board of directors' characteristics and corporate risk disclosure: the moderating role of family ownership
    Alshirah, Malek Hamed
    Abdul Rahman, Azhar
    Mustapa, Ifa Rizad
    [J]. EUROMED JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 2020, 15 (02) : 219 - 252
  • [6] Information disclosure by family-controlled firms The role of board independence and institutional ownership
    Darmadi, Salim
    Sodikin, Achmad
    [J]. ASIAN REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING, 2013, 21 (03) : 223 - +
  • [7] Gender diversity in the board room and sustainable growth rate: the moderating role of family ownership
    Amin, Ali
    Ali, Rizwan
    Rehman, Ramiz Ur
    Elamer, Ahmed A.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE & INVESTMENT, 2023, 13 (04) : 1577 - 1599
  • [8] Board Independence and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: The Mediating Role of the Presence of Family Ownership
    Bansal, Shashank
    Lopez-Perez, Maria Victoria
    Rodriguez-Ariza, Lazaro
    [J]. ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, 2018, 8 (03)
  • [9] From Family Director Pathos to Board Ethos: Managing Multiple Role Identity Struggles in the Boardroom of Family Firms
    Bettinelli, Cristina
    De Massis, Alfredo
    Singal, Manisha
    Davis, John
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, 2023,
  • [10] How do non-economic goals and priorities affect family firm's propensity to innovate in automation? The role of ownership, board of director, young successor and generation
    Banno, Mariasole
    D'Allura, Giorgia Maria
    Filippi, Emilia
    Trento, Sandro
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT, 2022, 25 (06) : 961 - 983