Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: Contests and Cournot oligopoly

被引：4

作者：

Gama, Adriana ^{[1
]}

Rietzke, David ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] El Colegio Mexico, Ctr Estudios Econo, Mexico City, DF, Mexico

[2] Univ Lancaster, Dept Econ, Lancaster, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2019年 / 183卷

关键词：

Contests; Supermodularity; Cournot oligopoly; Monotone comparative statics; RENT-SEEKING; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; EXISTENCE; UNIQUENESS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2019.08.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we employ lattice-theoretic techniques to derive a number of comparative statics in a logit contest a class of games for which best-replies are generically non-monotonic. Using the same approach, we obtain several comparative statics in a Cournot oligopoly model without imposing the usual assumptions that ensure the game is one of strategic substitutes. Our analysis illustrates how lattice-theoretic techniques can deliver powerful insights in games with non-monotonic best-replies. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：823 / 841

页数：19