Provably correct runtime monitoring

Runtime monitoring is an established technique to enforce a wide range of program safety and security properties. We present a formalization of monitoring and monitor inlining, for the Java Virtual Machine. Monitors are security automata given in a special-purpose monitor specification language, ConSpec. The automata operate on finite or infinite strings of calls to a fixed API, allowing local dependencies on parameter values and heap content. We use a two-level class file annotation scheme to characterize two key properties: (i) that the program is correct with respect to the monitor as a constraint on allowed program behavior, and (ii) that the program has a copy of the given monitor embedded into it. As the main application of these results we sketch a simple inlining algorithm and show how the two-level annotations can be completed to produce a fully annotated program which is valid in the standard sense of Floyd/Hoare logic. This establishes the mediation property that inlined programs are guaranteed to adhere to the intended policy. Furthermore, validity can be checked efficiently using a weakest precondition based annotation checker, thus preparing the ground for on-device checking of policy adherence in a proof-carrying code setting. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.