Wittgenstein and the Phenomenological Movement: Reply to Monk

Monk's 'The Temptations of Phenomenology' examines what the term 'Phanomenologie' meant for Wittgenstein. Contesting various other scholars, Monk claims that Wittgenstein's relation to 'Phanomenologie' began and ended during 1929. Monk only partially touches on the question of Wittgenstein's relation to the phenomenological movement during this time. Though Monk does not mention this, 1929 was also the year in which Ryle and Carnap turned their critical attention toward Heidegger. Wittgenstein also expressed his sympathy for Heidegger in 1929. Furthermore, though in 1929 Wittgenstein agrees with the early Husserl on relating logic and science to phenomenology, it is not clear that they mean the same thing by either logic or phenomenology, or that they agree on what the relation between the two should be.