Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities

J. Bergin and B. Lipman (Econometrica 64 (1996), 943-956) show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob (Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56) and P. Young (Econometrica 61 (1993), 57-84) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. This is shown to corroborate the results in Kandori-Mailath-Rob (1993) and, under certain regularity conditions, those in Young (1993). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).