In recent years, the advancements made in the field of neuroscience have been echoed in criminal law, reigniting the discussion on culpability from the viewpoint of if it actually exists, considering the echoes of determinism on the re-found non-existence of free will. This discussion has triggered, once again, the issue of the boundaries and inter-relations between (criminal) law and science, namely on whether normative or legal concepts and categories should acknowledge scientific breakthroughs. Bringing forth the theme of the limits of the law, this discussion is able to provide insight, with reference to a specific problem, as to whether there are plausible legal answers in the context of the ascription of liability if the subject of law ceases to be a responsible-and thus free-person. Taking into consideration evolution both of science and criminal law dogmatic, we aim to argue that in the particular case of culpability, the desired autonomy of law has its limitations, and that without such limitations the ascription of liability would not have a correct answer. For this argument we will firstly approach the meaning of culpability as a milestone of subjective responsibility in criminal law, so that we can then analyse some arguments made regarding the impact of neuroscience on the maintenance of a concept of culpability with the meaning given above, so that lastly we can proceed to the rebuttal of the overarching impact of (neuro) science on the law and advocate the autonomy of culpability within the necessary limits imposed by the needs of a plausible legal answer.
