Optimal Taxation and Monopsonistic Labor Market: Does Monopsony Justify the Minimum Wage?

被引:13
|
作者
Cahuc, Pierre [1 ]
Laroque, Guy [1 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Polytech, CREST INSEE, IZA, CEPR, F-92245 Malakoff, France
关键词
REDISTRIBUTION; CONSEQUENCES; LEGISLATION; SEARCH; TAXES;
D O I
10.1111/jpet.12063
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Does monopsony on the labor market in itself justify the implementation of a minimum wage when it would not be used in a competitive economy? This issue is studied in a model of optimal taxation. We find that there is no room for the minimum wage when there are a continuum of skills with no isolated mass point at the bottom of the wage distribution. Accordingly, in the empirically relevant situation, where there is a continuum of wages at the bottom of the distribution, the minimum wage is not helpful.
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 273
页数:15
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