Generative Model of Bid Sequences in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

被引:0
|
作者
Xu, Yida [1 ,2 ]
Tembine, Hamidou [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] New York Univ Abu Dhabi, Learning & Game Theory Lab, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
[2] NYU, Tandon Sch Engn, New York, NY 10003 USA
关键词
LUBA; auction; game theory; generative model; recurrent neural network;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) sites are gaining popularity on the Internet in recent years, In this paper, we study LUBA with resubmission in discrete bid spaces. A long-standing goal in the held of Internet auction is to develop agents that can perceive and understand the strategy information behind the mechanism and can guide us to behave in a fast, frugal and smart way. We marry ideas from recurrent neural network and data to learn a generative model for generating winning bid sequences. A sequence of winning bids in Internet auctions can be viewed as a sequence of events and modeled by generative models, We learn a model that is able to capture the long dependencies in a winning bid sequence. The generated data obtained from our model and the ground truth dataset share similar distributions.
引用
收藏
页码:3179 / 3184
页数:6
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