Group lending with adverse selection

被引：37
|
作者：
Laffont, JJ
N'Guessan, T
机构：
[1] Univ Sci Sociales Toulouse, ARQADE, Toulouse, France
[2] Univ Sci Sociales Toulouse, IDEI, Toulouse, France
[3] Univ Cocody, CREMIDE, Abidjan, Cote Ivoire
[4] Univ Cocody, CIRES, Abidjan, Cote Ivoire
来源：
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2000年 / 44卷 / 4-6期
关键词：
group lending; adverse selection; development;
D O I：
10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00041-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We focus on adverse selection as a foundation of group lending. In a simple static model we show that there is no collateral effect if borrowers do not know each other. If the borrowers know each other, group lending implements efficient lending. However, it is not robust to collusive behavior, when transfers are allowed between colluding partners, Finally, we characterize the optimal collusion-proof group contract. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: O2; G2; C7.
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页码：773 / 784
页数：12
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