Ownership of property-rights and the allocation of talents

被引:3
|
作者
Liu, Haoming [1 ]
Riyanto, Yohanes E. [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 117570, Singapore
关键词
MAJOR-LEAGUE BASEBALL; FREE-AGENCY; COMPETITIVE BALANCE; SPORTS LEAGUES; LABOR-MARKET; EVOLUTION; MOBILITY;
D O I
10.1080/00036840701392869
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Under the reserve-clause system that assigns the property-rights on the Major League Baseball players' services to teams, player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players. In contrast, under the current free-agency system, players with free-agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors. Thus, the system assigns the property-rights to players. Using data extracted from the Baseball Archive (http://baseball1.com), this article examines the effect of the change in the property-rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams. We find that the change increased large-market teams' shares of veteran all-star players and the concentration of senior players.
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页码:3425 / 3436
页数:12
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