The North Korean missile and nuclear crises: China's historic and strategic stakes on the Korean Peninsula

The article analyzes the recent troubled relationship between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), following the July missile tests and the October nuclear test. One would wonder if Pyongyang was countering a potential Sino-Russian-Japanese rapprochement in the making, given the fortuitous timing of the nuclear test. One could also wonder if Pyongyang was playing a "provocative role" against a relative Sino-South Korea "rapprochement," as Pyongyang may fear being "nailed" by all this rapprochement, thus losing its own diplomatic hand eventually on the Korean Peninsula. A recap of the tumultuous history of Sino-Korean relations could offer some clues, as Pyongyang would have attempted to play traditional power politics, like in the past 320 years, whereas China would ensure not being "sucked" into conflicts and controversies over Korea, as history has shown. The entree of the United States into the Korean fray via the Portsmouth Treaty (September 1905) and the Taft-Katusra "Agreement" (July 1905) was significant, as Washington had then joined Beijing, Tokyo and Moscow in "balancing" Korean forces on the Peninsula, a fact that has not changed fundamentally till today. But there is also a fundamental shift operating, as Seoul further distances itself from Washington's hard-line policy and "shifts" toward a softer line espoused by Beijing vis-h-vis Pyongyang, clearly for commercial and affinity-related issues. Finally, Beijing could have been deemed to have scored a diplomatic triumph from its "initial disappointment" and Pyongyang's "hanran" (meaning brazen or flagrant) action, following its missile and nuclear tests; the DPRK will likely return to the Six-Party Talks in December, thus giving Beijing a decisive diplomatic triumph on the Korean peninsula.