Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

被引:23
|
作者
Qiao, Mo [1 ]
Ding, Siying [2 ,3 ]
Liu, Yongzheng [4 ]
机构
[1] Peking Univ, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Renmin Univ China, Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Indiana Univ, Dept Econ, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
[4] Renmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, Inst Publ Finance & Taxat, Sch Finance, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Fiscal decentralization; Government size; Democracy; CENTRAL-BANK INDEPENDENCE; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; LEVIATHAN; FEDERALISM; CORRUPTION; POLICY; STATE;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.04.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972-2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.
引用
收藏
页码:316 / 330
页数:15
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