Meritocracy in Village Elections: The "Separation of Election and Employment" Scheme in Rural China

Local governments in China face a fundamental 'democracy dilemma' in rural governance: although elected village cadres may not be capable or controllable, local governments cannot change or abolish village self-government, as enshrined in China's Constitution and the national laws. However, there has recently been a new way of dealing with this dilemma for local governments: called the 'Separation of Election and Employment' (xuan pin fenli, SEE) [of village cadres]. Based on an in-depth case study of a Zhejiang county, this article argues that SEE is a typical type of institutional layering, which adds a new meritocratic village cadre management system onto existing village democracy. This is a path-dependent institutional change, emulating the Chinese Communist Party's nomenklatura and bianzhi systems. This research has broader implications concerning gradual institutional change and political meritocracy.