Cooperation in the Climate Commons

被引:56
|
作者
Carattini, Stefano [1 ,2 ]
Levin, Simon [3 ]
Tavoni, Alessandro [2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Dept Econ, CESifo, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
[2] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Grantham Res Inst, London, England
[3] Princeton Univ, Dept Ecol & Evolutionary Biol, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[4] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, Bologna, Italy
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会; 英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
COLLECTIVE ACTION; SOCIAL NORMS; TRUST; PARTICIPATION; PREFERENCES; PROTECTION; DIFFUSION; EMISSIONS; FAIRNESS; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1093/reep/rez009
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Climate change is a global externality that has proven difficult to address through formal institutions alone due to the public good properties of climate change mitigation and the lack of a supranational institution for enforcing global treaties. Given these circumstances, which are arguably the most challenging for international cooperation, commitment problems and free-riding incentives for countries to delay costly mitigation efforts are major obstacles to effective environmental agreements. Starting from this premise, we examine domestic mitigation efforts, with the goal of assessing the extent to which the willingness of individuals to contribute voluntarily to the public good of climate mitigation could be scaled up to the global level. Although individual environmental actions are clearly insufficient for achieving ambitious global mitigation targets, we argue that they are nevertheless initial and essential steps in the right direction. In fact, individual and community efforts may be particularly important if local interventions encourage shifts in norms and behaviors that favor large-scale transformations. With this in mind, we discuss the importance of the visibility of norms and the role of beliefs when such visibility is lacking and their implications for leveraging cooperative behavior to increase climate mitigation efforts locally and globally.
引用
收藏
页码:227 / 247
页数:21
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