Hintikka on the "Kant-Frege View": A Critical Assessment

In "Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument" (1981), Hintikka argues that the so-called "Kant-Frege view" (i.e., the claim that Kant is a forerunner of Frege's treatment of existence) is wrong, for its supporters erroneously assume that for Kant 'is' is ambiguous. In this paper, I will first critically evaluate Hintikka's arguments against the Kant-Frege view. Then, I will attempt to prove that Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate and Frege's claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically interdependent. Finally, I will use the Kant-Frege view in order to reconcile the various claims that Kant makes about existence.