Non-controlling Large Shareholders and Firm Performance in China

被引:9
|
作者
Yan, Caiyu [1 ]
He, Hongqu [1 ]
机构
[1] Cent S Univ, Sch Business, 932 South Lushan Rd, Changsha 410083, Hunan, Peoples R China
关键词
China; Firm performance; Investment efficiency; Non-controlling large shareholders; Tunneling; MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; VALUATIONS; MANAGEMENT; MECHANISMS; DIRECTORS; GROWTH;
D O I
10.1111/ajfs.12216
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the determination of non-controlling large shareholders (NCLSs) on firm performance and investigates the impacts of NCLSs on tunneling and investment efficiency. We use three attributes of NCLSs (ownership, identity, and relational board/management representation) to fully capture the governance effects of NCLSs. We find robust evidence that NCLSs are associated with higher firm performance. Furthermore, we also document that NCLSs promote investment efficiency. However, except for individual investors, the other items in NCLSs deteriorate tunneling. Additionally, except for mutual funds, we find that the other governance effects of NCLSs are stable under different circumstances.
引用
收藏
页码:401 / 425
页数:25
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