Sharing nonconvex costs

被引：23
|
作者：
Evstigneev, IV
Flam, SD
机构：
[1] Acad Sci Russia, Cent Econ & Math Inst, Moscow 117418, Russia
[2] Univ Bergen, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
[3] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
来源：
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL OPTIMIZATION | 2001年 / 20卷 / 3-4期
关键词：
cooperative games; production games; core allocations; lack of convexity; duality gap;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1017599310112
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
The paper analyzes cooperative games with side payments. Each player faces a possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggregate (or pool) members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.
引用
收藏
页码：257 / 271
页数：15
相关论文
共 50 条
12345