The private value single item bisection auction

被引：16
|
作者：
Grigorieva, Elena
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Mueller, Rudolf
Vermeulen, Dries
机构：
[1] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Quantitat Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 30卷 / 01期
关键词：
single item auction; weakly dominant strategy; extensive form games of incomplete information; information revelation; binary search;
D O I：
10.1007/s00199-005-0032-z
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we present a new iterative auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. The bisection auction has fewer rounds than the classical English auction and causes less information to be revealed than the Vickrey auction. Still, it preserves all characteristics the English auction shares with the Vickrey auction: there exists an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in which everyone behaves truthfully, the object is allocated in accordance with efficiency requirements to the buyer who has the highest valuation, and the price paid by the winner of the object equals the second-highest valuation
引用
收藏
页码：107 / 118
页数：12
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