The influence of financial intermediaries' ownership on firm value. Empirical evidence for the companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange

被引:0
|
作者
Vintila, Georgeta [1 ]
Gherghina, Stefan Cristian [1 ]
机构
[1] Bucharest Univ Econ Studies, Bucharest 010374, Romania
关键词
Institutional Investors Ownership; The Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis; The Conflict of Interest Hypothesis; The Strategic Alignment Hypothesis; Firm Value; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; CASH FLOW;
D O I
10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00655-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The aim of this study consists in providing the first empirical evidence for the companies listed in Romania regarding the influence of financial intermediaries' ownership on firm value. The empirical research was carried out for a sample of companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE), over the period 2007-2011, being estimated multivariate regression models for panel data, unbalanced, with fixed effects. The companies' value was measured through Tobin's Q ratio, but adjusted in order to account for the industry membership diversity of the selected companies. We considered the ownership of the five Romanian Financial Investment Companies (SIF-s), the ownership of the Investment Funds and Financial Investment Service Companies (SSIF-s), as well the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries, including in the last the Property Fund (FP) ownership, but only for 2011, when the Romanian Government became minority shareholder. The results provide support for a positive influence of the five Romanian Financial Investment Companies on firm value, but up to an ownership threshold of 23.71 percent, whereupon the influence becomes negative. By considering the ownership of the Investment Funds and Financial Investment Service Companies, we identified a positive influence on firm value. Further, the results provide support for a positive influence of the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries on firm value, but up to an ownership threshold of 50.3 percent, whereupon the influence becomes negative. Therefore, down to the identified ownership thresholds we could validate the active monitoring hypothesis according to which there are sufficient incentives inside of financial intermediaries in order to oversee corporate performance (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码:959 / 967
页数:9
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