Public choice and tort reform

被引:17
|
作者
Rubin, PH [1 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s11127-005-4763-y
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The common law originally was thought to be immune to rent seeking. More recently, scholars have recognized that attorneys are engaged in exactly that activity. Rent seeking by the legal profession has greatly expanded the scope of US tort law, and generated efforts to reverse its expansion. Organized groups (attorneys, businesses and doctors) are active on both sides of the issue and the partisans have numerous tools available for advancing their agendas, such as litigating, lobbying for favorable rules and attempting to elect sympathetic legislators and judges. All of this creates an ideal setting for public choice analysis.
引用
收藏
页码:223 / 236
页数:14
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