North Korea;
nuclear proliferation;
coercive bargaining;
systematic maintenance;
D O I:
10.1080/09512748.2011.554992
中图分类号:
K9 [地理];
学科分类号:
0705 ;
摘要:
North Korea is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear programme because of its importance to the political economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) state and the perpetuation of the Kim regime. Two observations give rise to this conclusion: firstly, the development of North Korea's nuclear programme has been a long-term project spanning several decades. At no stage has Pyongyang shown a commitment to its dismantlement. Secondly, denuclearisation negotiations have followed a cyclical pattern in which the North has provoked crises to make new demands and gain leverage in negotiations. By inference, it is clear that the nuclear programme has great intrinsic value to Pyongyang. This paper argues that the nuclear programme has value as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy to extract economic inputs for its moribund economy, in domestic politics as vehicle for bureaucratic interests and as a rallying symbol of the country's hyper-nationalist ideology, as well as its role as a defensive deterrent and important cog in Pyongyang's offensive asymmetric war strategy. For these reasons, the Kim regime is unlikely to seriously entertain nuclear disarmament.
机构:
Flinders Univ S Australia, Sch Polit & Int Studies, Adelaide, SA, AustraliaFlinders Univ S Australia, Sch Polit & Int Studies, Adelaide, SA, Australia
Ben Habib
O'Neil, Andrew
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机构:
Flinders Univ S Australia, Sch Polit & Int Studies, Adelaide, SA, Australia
Flinders Univ S Australia, Int Relat, Adelaide, SA, Australia
Australian Res Council Project, Australias Nucl Choices, Canberra, ACT, AustraliaFlinders Univ S Australia, Sch Polit & Int Studies, Adelaide, SA, Australia