Conditional cooperation, context and why strong rules work - A Namibian common-pool resource experiment

被引:8
|
作者
Roettgers, Dirk [1 ]
机构
[1] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Inst Environm Econ & World Trade, Konigsworther Pl 1, D-30167 Hannover, Germany
关键词
Common-pool resource experiment; Conditional cooperation; Framing; Context; Leadership; Namibia; OPINION LEADERSHIP; FIELD EXPERIMENTS; DECISION-MAKING; PUBLIC-GOODS; GOVERNANCE; PREFERENCES; INSTITUTIONS; COMMUNITIES; MANAGEMENT; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.03.013
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
Common-pool resource experiments in the field have not yet fully explored cooperative decision-making in its dependence on established past behavior, explicit rules and environmental context. The purpose of this paper is to analyze these factors and their single as well as combined influence on cooperative behavior. The results show that rule enforcement changes the influence of past action as a determinant of cooperation: Past action retains relevance for decision-making but reveals a partly contrarian influence as long as rules are strong. Further, the introduction of explicit rules does not change the influence of personal relationships among participants, but renders the influence of leadership insignificant. Furthermore, the experiments show that context plays a decisive role, which suggests the possibility of tailoring experiments to specific uses: If the context-specific behavior of locals is relevant to policy decisions, then experiments can help capture these effects. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:21 / 31
页数:11
相关论文
共 22 条
  • [1] Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment
    Ouvrard, Benjamin
    Ambec, Stefan
    Reynaud, Arnaud
    Cezera, Stephane
    Shivamurthy, Murudaiah
    [J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2022, 59 (03) : 605 - 635
  • [2] Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment
    Benjamin Ouvrard
    Stefan Ambec
    Arnaud Reynaud
    Stéphane Cezera
    Murudaiah Shivamurthy
    [J]. Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 59 : 605 - 635
  • [3] The impact of culture and ecology on cooperation in a common-pool resource experiment
    Prediger, Sebastian
    Vollan, Bjoern
    Froelich, Markus
    [J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 70 (09) : 1599 - 1608
  • [4] Intergroup cooperation prevents resource exhaustion but undermines intragroup cooperation in the common-pool resource experiment
    Safarzynska, Karolina
    [J]. ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY, 2017, 22 (04):
  • [5] A common-pool resource experiment in acequia communities
    Raheem, Nejem
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS, 2015, 9 (01): : 306 - 321
  • [6] Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-Pool Resource Experiment
    De Geest, Lawrence R.
    Kingsley, David C.
    [J]. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 2021, 9 (1-2): : 1 - 26
  • [7] The Impact of Resource Uncertainty and Intergroup Conflict on Harvesting in the Common-Pool Resource Experiment
    Safarzynska, Karolina
    [J]. ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, 2018, 71 (04): : 1001 - 1025
  • [8] The Impact of Resource Uncertainty and Intergroup Conflict on Harvesting in the Common-Pool Resource Experiment
    Karolina Safarzynska
    [J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2018, 71 : 1001 - 1025
  • [9] Analyzing group communication dynamics and content in a common-pool resource experiment
    Hoffmann, Patrick
    Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio
    Lopez, Maria Claudia
    [J]. PLOS ONE, 2023, 18 (05):
  • [10] Understanding the black box of communication in a common-pool resource field experiment
    Lopez, Maria Claudia
    Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio
    [J]. ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY, 2017, 68 : 69 - 79