What does "I think about an empirical Sentence"?

The main objective of this paper is to clarify the meaning of Kant's claim that 'I think' is an 'empirical sentence'. In order to do this, I analyze and interpret a passage from B 422 (footnote) in the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is claimed that the 'I think' is an empirical sentence. In interpreting this passage, two different approaches come to mind: On the first reading (L1), the statement 'I think' is an empirical sentence because it expresses a perception of 'I am', i.e. a perception of my own self. On the second reading (L2), the sentence 'I think' is empirical in that the 'I think' will be activated only when empirical representations are given to intuition. I shall show that these two approaches can be reconciled in the following way: The proposition 'I think' can be regarded as an empirical statement in the sense that the activity 'I think' always arises together with empirical representations, whereby the 'I' cognizes itself simultaneously in its 'I am'.