Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment

被引：25
|
作者：
Bracht, Juergen [2 ]
Figuieres, Charles [1 ]
Ratto, Marisa [3 ]
机构：
[1] INRA UMR LAMETA, F-34060 Montpellier 1, France
[2] Univ Aberdeen, Sch Business, Dept Econ, Aberdeen AB9 1FX, Scotland
[3] Policy Studies Inst, London, England
来源：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 92卷 / 1-2期
基金：
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
public goods; voluntary provision; incentive mechanisms;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents' contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：54 / 90
页数：37
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