The rationality debate from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory

被引：9
|
作者：
Epstein, S [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Psychol, Amherst, MA 01003 USA
来源：
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES | 2000年 / 23卷 / 05期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1017/S0140525X0028343X
中图分类号：
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号：
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要：
A problem with Stanovich & West's inference that there a nonintellectual processing system independent from an intellectual one from data in which they partialled out global intelligence is that they may have controlled for the wrong kind of intellectual intelligence. Research on cognitive-experiential self-theory over the past two decades provides much stronger support for two independent processing systems.
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页码：671 / +
页数：11
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