Changing circumstances and leveled commitment: A compensatory approach to contracting

被引:0
|
作者
Ponka, Ilja [1 ]
Jennings, Nicholas R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Southampton, Sch Elect & Comp Sci, Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hants, England
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
In dynamic and uncertain e-commerce settings, the value of contracts can change after they have been entered into. Sometimes this can make the contract in question counterproductive to the affected parties. Given this, leveled commitment contracts, in which one agent pays the other a fee to be released from their decommitment, are widely used However, these fees are often seen only as a deterrent of decommitment and the fact that the decommitment also affects the other party and the society in general is usually ignored This paper investigates an alternative view, coming from law, that sees the decommitment fees as a means of compensating the victim for their loss. Moreover we show that these compensatory policies can outperform their traditional non-compensatory counterparts in terms of total utility (the sum of all agent's utilities) in situations in which the utility of one of the parties decreases after the contract has been entered into, but before it is due to be performed
引用
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页码:141 / +
页数:2
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