Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

被引：70
|
作者：
Hafalir, Isa E. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2007年 / 61卷 / 02期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
coalition formation; externalities; partition function games; Shapley value; implementation;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：242 / 258
页数：17
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