Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model

被引：6
|
作者：
Kalandrakis, Tasos [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Rochester, Dept Polit Sci, Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[2] Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | 2016年 / 28卷 / 04期
关键词：
Dynamic bargaining; endogenous status quo; Pareto efficiency; LEGISLATIVE POLICY-MAKING; MAJORITY;
D O I：
10.1177/0951629815586881
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
Pareto-dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preferences that satisfy the single-plateau property. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences.
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页码：525 / 536
页数：12
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